the duty of every lawyer who, with Jeremy Bentham, decries the "original sin of judicial procedure-the substitution of the actual ends of judicature for the ends of justice."
Consistently enough with the shifting of emphasis before mentioned, one characteristic of the existing condition is precisely that which in the eyes of the French philosophers of the 18th century might have passed for a virtue, namely, the tendency to cause a given case td be viewed abstractly and decided mechanically, by subordinating the verities to an artificial juristic situation-in other words, the disposition to make the ultimate inquiry, not whether the accused is guilty or innocent, but whether the requirements of the applicable legal formula have been in all respects satisfied. It is the "attitude of record-worship," the "trial of the record rather than the case," to use the phi-ases of Professor Pound, 6 that is here in question. And the root of this evil is to be found, for the most part, in the present rules of criminal pleading, particularly in those relating to the framing of the indictment.
From a superficial examination of the statutory provision that every indictment "shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct which states the offense in the terms and language of the statutes creating: the offense or so plainly that the nature of the offense may be readily understood by the jury," with the further injunction that after the caption, the offense and the time and place of its commission shall be inserted with reasonable certainty-, 7 it might be supposed that the task of the pleader need not involve great technical skill. But in following the course of decision under this section we become painfully aware that the case is quite otherwise. The "terms and language of the statute" will not suffice except where the statute describes the particular act constituting the offense, and the "nature of the offense" has come to mean something essentially different from the real signification of the words. And this has been 'brought about by the application of two common law doctrines, generally followed in American jurisdictions-first, that the indictment shall set forth all the juristic elements of the offense, shall allege with completeness the State's cause of action; and, secondly, that its allegations shall answer the tesf of certainty as fixed by the common law. It is to 5 Bentham, Principles of Judicial Procedure, c. 29.
6A Practical Program of Procedural Reform, Proceedings of Illinois State
Bar Association for 1910, p. 395; Report of Committee E of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, 1 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 587. these doctrines that we owe, in large measure, the miscarriages, not of law, but of justice, which our reports so abundantly disclose.
In any endeavor to improve the system of criminal pleading, with relation to the indictment, the first thing is to determine the fundamental question of procedural polity: Is the office of the indictment to remain as it is, not only that of furnishing information to the defendant of what he is charged with, but also and with equal emphasis that of furnishing a statement of the offenge to the court and providing a memorial beyond whose borders we need not look for the legal elements of the crime? In other words, are we to say that the function of the indictment should be more than that of giving reasonable notice to the accused, of advising him of what he is called upon to meet? Every consideration of practical justice requires that a negative answer be returned. So far as notice to the court is concerned, as distinguished from notice to the accused, the supposed benefit of this to the defendant, as marked by a learned writer, is that he is enabled to call for a decision on the sufficiency of the case as shown on the face of the indictment. But, as this writer says: "Of what importance is it to the court to know whether or not the facts alleged constitute an offense, when, after the evidence has been presented, it will have an opportunity to determine whether or not the facts proven constitute an offense? *.. * What real difference can it make to him [the defendant] whether he present a defense which he has by a plea of not guilty, or by a demurrer? If he is allowed to present the, particular matter which he wishes to allege by a plea of not guilty, he is deprived of no substantial right by a law which abolishes motions to quash. If the right to demur is taken away, it cannot be said that any constitutional privilege has been infringed. Nor can it be said that any right of the defendant is violated if the court is prohibited from deciding the case on the pleadings, and is required to decide it on the facts." s So far as concerns the function which the indictment is supposed to fulfill in providing a memorial, the sole usefulness with which it is credited is in aiding the defendant to establish a defense of res judicata. If the defendant were restricted to record evidence in the presentation of this defense, or if record evidence would always suffice to establish the identity of the two offenses, this function might appear an indispensable one. But everyone knows that the defendant is not confined to record evidence in this regard. And it is probably not overstating the fact to say that the production of the record alone of the former proceeding will seldom make out a case for the defendant. In fact, the Supreme Court has gone far toward laying the ghost of this supposed function. Answering the contention in People v. Brady,' that the statutory form of indictment for practicing the "confidence game' did not state sufficient facts to enable the defendant to interpose the judgment as a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, the court said: "Under the present practice, whether the indictment is for the same offense as that charged in a former indictment under which there has been a final judgment is not determined by an inspection and comparison of the two indictments, under a plea setting up the former judgment in bar. The defense of former acquittal or conviction may be made under the plea of not guilty, and on the trial the party accused and the particular offense may be shown by parol testimony." It is plain, therefore, that the function which the indictment is crediting with fulfilling in the present respect is one that it does not adequately fulfill. By dispensing with the necessity of specifying all the legal elements of the offense charged, we change nothing in the rules relating to proof of a former acquittal or conviction. The defendant will start by producing the record and follow with parol evidence if the record does not sufficiently establish the identity exactly as he does at present. He may, on occasion, be obliged to resort to parol evidence for something which at present is in the indictment, but the only difference will be one of degree and not of principle.
That the function last referred to is one which the indictment is not constitutionally required to fulfill seems to admit of-no doubt. And that specification of the juristic elements of the offense is constitutionally necessary beyond the bounds of reasonable notice for any other purpose cannot well be contended. Although it has been said by the Supreme Court that the legislature cannot dispense with "a statement of the essential elements of the crime," the decisions in the two cases where this expression was used-one of them being People v. Brady, supra-and the other language employed in the opinions clearly show that what was meant was not the juristic elements, as such, but the elements essential to give the defendant notice of-the nature and cause of the accusation, and that the real test of a constitutional accusation is whether or not it gives such notice. 'oPeople v. Clark, 256 Ill. 14; People v. Brady, supra. accused is equivalent to a statement of the legal elements of the crime, but in frequent instances there is a wide gap between the two. Take, for example, the statute as to rape." By that statute the offense of rape has been committed when a male person over the age of seventeen years has carnally known a female person, not his wife, under the age of sixteen years, with or without her consent. Now the essential elements.of the crime, where there has been consent, are: (1) That the defendant had carnal knowledge of a female person; (2) that the female was not his wife at the time of the act; (3) that, at the time, the defendant was more than seventeen years of age, and (4) that, at the time, the female was under the age of sixteen years. Does reasonable notice to the .defendant here require that he be apprised 6f his .own age at the time of the-offense or that the victim was not then his wife? Yet today an indictment which omits to state either of these two facts will not support a judgment of conviction. Take again the case of perjury committed, in the course of a judicial proceeding. Some diminution of the old strictness of allegation has been here effected by statute, but it is still necessary for the indictment to show, at least by a general averment, that the court in which the proceeding was pending had jurisdiction of the subject matter. That proof of this fact is essential to conviction, no one can gainsay, but does its allegation in any. way aid the' defendant in preparing ,for trial? Still again, take the case of an offense whose prosecution would have been barred by the statute of limitations except for the fact that defendant "was not usually and publicly resident within this State" during the whole or part of the limitation period. Does the defendant need to be-told of his own absence from the State? Yet, if the date of the offense appears to be prior to the limitation period; it is held, and under existing law, correctly held, that the .omission to state the absence invalidates the indictment.'-If reasonable notice to the defendant be made the operative test, there will thus become unnecessary a class of allegations whose presence does the defendant no more than an academic good and the public a very appreciable amount of harm.
It is this-principle of reasonable notice or information which has obtained entrance into the English Indictments Act of. tive of such act without a detailed description thereof," that -the words used in a statute to define a crime or other words conveying the same meaning, may be used," " and that "the circumstances ot the act may be stated according to their legal effect, without a lull description thereof." 21 It also provides that "the court may upon the arraignment of the defendant, or at any later stage of the proceedings, order the prosecution to file a statement of such particulars as may be necessary to give the defendant reasonable knowledge of the nature and grounds of the crime charged, and if it has final jurisdiction of the crime shall do so at the request of the defendant, if the charge would not be otherwise fully, plainly, substantially and formally set out." 25 "Fully, plainly, substantially and formally," it may be parenthetically observed, is the phrase used in the Massachusetts Bill of Rights as characterizing the manner of accusation to which the defendant is entitled."
It further provides that "if in order to prepare his defense, the defendant desires information as to the time and place of the alleged crime or as to the means by which it is alleged to have been committed, or more specific information as to the exact nature of the property described as money, or, if indicted for larceny, as to the crime which he is alleged to have committed, he may apply for a bill of particulars as aforesaid." Forms of indictment appropriate under the act are the following: Murder: "That A. B. did assault and beat C. D., with intent to murder him, by striking him over the head with an ax, and by such assault and beating did kill and murder C. In Professor Mikell's draft act, it is similarly provided that "(1) the indictment may indicate the offense by using the specific name given to the offense by the common law or by a statute" or "(2) that the indictment may indicate the offense by stating so much of the offense either in terms of common law or of the statute defining the offense, or in terms of substantially the same meaning, as is sufficient to give the court notice of'what offense is charged. when an indictment indicates an offense in either-of these two ways, "but does not inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, the prosecuting officer may of his own motion and shall, when ordered by the court, which in all cases shall so order at the request of the accused, file a bid of particulars as may be necessary to give the. accused information of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." 2 "Nature and cause of the accusation," it is to be noted, is the more common expression definitive of the defendant's constitutional right to information. In addition, the court is given power to require a bill of particulars giving the defendant "-information desirable for the defense of the accused upon the merits of the case. . It will be seen that these three acts agree in providing for (1) a designation of the offense, and (2) such particulars as, will reasonably convey information to the defendant of the offense charged. .The method is substantially that of charge and specification long obtaining in the practice of military tribunals. Two differences, however, appear between the English act 6n the one hand and the Masschusetts act and the draft act on the other. The first is a difference in form, namely, that the English act contemplates the inclusion of the particulars in the indictment, while, under the other two, these are primarily matters for bills of particulars. But it would be perfectly practicable under the Massachusetts act to draw the indictment in such wise as to dispense with the necessity of a bill of particulars, if such a course was deemed desirable. As to the draft act, the committee say: "There is nothing in the act to prevent the stating of the transaction 3 2 in the first pleading and the expectation is that * * * such information will usually be found in the first pleading.3 Moreover, under the draft act, the bill of particulars is taken asi amending the indictment." 4 The second difference is one of substance, and.is due to the constitutional provisions for notice to the accused, which must be taken into consideration by American legislation. The Eng-29 Sec. 8. 80 Sec. 8.
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Sec. 7.
s2"Transaction" is the name given in the act to the subject matter 'cf the specification, "offense" is the name given to the subject matter of the charge. lish act proceeds on the theory, as, of course, it may, that, when the indictment has been drawn in accordance with its provisions and tmose of the rules, the accused has a right to no more. It does not touch the pre-existing power of the court to order a bill of particulars, but this: remains, as before, discretionary. The Massachusetts act recognizes the right of the defendant to have the charge "fully, plainly, formally and substantially described," as required by the Bill of Rights, and, while dispensing with the necessity of satisfying this' right in the indictment itself, makes it the duty of the State to accomplish this purpose, on the defendant's request, by bill of particulars. if he makes no request, his constitutional right will be deemed to have been waived. The same is true of the draft act, except that here the constitutional provision kept in view is the one contained in our own Bill of Rights, namely, that the defendant shall be informed of the "nature and cause of the accusation." Up to the point of being so informed the defendant has a right to have the offense described either by the indictment alone or by the indictment and bill of particulars. Beyond this point, the acts, in varying terms, both provide for the discretionary granting of a bill of particulars.
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If we should resolve upon the introduction of the salutary principle contended for, that of reasonable notice or information to the accused, pattern and precedent are thus ready to hand.
Along with this principle, and the consequent discarding of the doctrine that the indictment shall necessarily set forth the legal elements *of the crime, measures are required to counteract that second doctrine which has contributed so seriously to reversals of criminal convictions-the doctrine relating to the certainty requisite in allegation. We shall have to take care that in conveying information to the accused, the averments shall not be subjected to the over-nice tests of the present standard. The rule is a well settled one in this State, that the highest degree of certainty is required in an indictment.
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Sometimes this is spoken of as "reasonable certainty," 37 as "a reasonable degree of certainty, using the term 'certainty' in its common law sense." 38 But the difference of name has little effect in the result. " the failure to specify the juristic nature of the ownetr of stolen goods where that owner, is other than an individual.
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Here, too, belongs the matter of technical terms. "Certain technical terms," says a writer experienced in criminal practice, "must be borne in mind constantly in the preparation of the indictment. If the statute says that a thing 'wilfully and maliciously' done is an offense, the statutory words must be averred and to omit them is fatal. This applies to 'corruptly,' %urglariously' and many other words used by the statute in the specific offense." 47 To attain fully the object in view-that of making it clear that the "highest degree of certainty" test is once and for all laid asidewill require a number of detailed rules. At the outset.will be useful some such general rule as the following from the draft act: "No indictment or bill of particulars is invalid or insufficient for the reason merely that it alleges indirectly or by inference, instead of directly, any matters, facts and circumstances connected with or constituting the offense, provided that the nature and cause of the accusation can be understood by a person of common understanding." " This might well be associated with the English rule generally applicable to description that "it shall be sufficient to describe any place, time, thing, matter, act, or omission * * * in ordinary language in such a manner as to indicate with reasonable clearness the place, time, thing, matter, act or omission referred to." " Following general provisions of this character would come other rules providing that certain requirements due to specific application of the present test should no longer obtain. It will have to be considered, for example, how far we may dispense with the allegation of the means of commission. In England, it was provided by statute, as long ago as 1861, that in cases of murder the manner or means of causing the death need not be set forth., 0 This, likewise, is the present rule in something like twenty American states. Under the Massachusetts act"' and the draft act, 52 the means in no case need be stated unless they are essential to the designation of the crime. Under the former, as already seen, they are expressly mentioned as the proper subject of a bill of particulars, 3 the granting of which, however, would be discretionary where their statement would not be essential to a compliance with the constitutional requirement. There is no such express mention in the draft act, but the general provision as to bills of particulars would permit like information under a like condition.
The matter of time and place will similarly demand attention. Here the Massachusetts act and the draft act, in harmony with the rule obtaining in England since a statute of 1851,--do not require the allegation of time, except when it is of the essence of the offense. They both apply the like rule to place. Unless otherwise stated the time is taken to be a time before the finding of the indictment, after the act became an offense and within the limitation period, and the place, a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court-5 But the granting by bill of particulars of information relating to time and place is governed in each by the same considerations which apply to the means of commission.
Such rules should also be directed to the question of the description of property. The English rule in this regard is that the description "'shall be in ordinary language, and such as to indicate with reasonable clearness the property referred to." 56 -In particular, the enumeration of so many coins, so many bills, etc., in describing money should cease to be necessary, in any case. This requirement likewise was done away with in England in 1851.5 7 There, consequently, it is no new thing "to describe coifi or bank notes as money without specifying any particular coin or bank riote."
53 ' The draft act has a provision to the same effect and extends the principle to every species of negotiable security."' And, subject to the express statutory reference to a bill of particulars in such instance, the same is true of the Massachusetts act.
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By the draft act, moreover, non-negotiable securities may be described in the indictment as "funds."
6 ' The connected questions of, value and ownership should' also receive attention. In England, by the act of 1851, already mentioned, it was provided, that the absence" of a statement of price or value should not vitiate the indictment except where-price or value is of the essence of the offenge. 62 This particular provision is -repealed by the new legislation; but in the rules it is substantially -re-enacted by the provision that value need not be stated except where 'the offense depends "on any special value' of property. 63 The other two procedures in question conctir, in this principle. on the same basis as value. It is not to be stated except where the offense depends on "any special ownership." 6 The Massachusetts act similarly provides that if the property is sufficiently described in other respects to identify the act, the name of the owner need not be alleged while the draft act goes perhaps a little farther than either of the others, dispensing with the allegation of ownership except where necessary to indicate the offense.
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Under this head would also come a provision solving the .difficulty which is presented when, in a case where ownership has to be alleged it is found to be vested in a voluntary society or unincorporated association composed of a large'number of members. The English rules reach this by providing that it shall be enough, in such case, to lay the ownership in one of the members "with others," or to use the collective name if there be one. 68 The draft act adopts the same method "for the purpose of identifying any group or association" generally." s And a further valuable contribution of the draft act in this particular is the provision "that it is not necessary for such purpose of identification to state the legal form of such group or association of persons or any corporation.7' The propriety of such a rule is emphasized by recollection of People v. Brander7 1 where an indictment charging embezzlement from the "American Express Company, an association," was held, insufficient to support a-conviction, on the ground that it lacked "any averment of ownership in any person, firm, corporation or other entity that may be the owner of property." 71 A further result of the existing test calling loudly for modification is the one which requires that "every indictment for forgery or other crime, the essence of which consists in the publication or fabrication of a written instrument," 7 must not only set out the instrument in haec verba, but must profess to so set it out. The case of People v. Tilden, exhibits the unfortunate effect of this requirement. There, though the indictment had set forth the instrument apparently in the precise terms proved at the trial, the conviction could not stand because the prefatory allegation used the expression "in words and figures in substance as follows," instead of "in words and figures as follows": There is need of neither part of the requirement. The indictment ought to be sufficient if it identifies the instrument. Here the English rule is that "when it is necessary to refer to any document or instrument in an indictment, it shall be sufficient to describe it by the name or designation ,by which it is usually known or by the purport thereof, without setting out any copy thereof." 74 In England this change in the common law rule dates from the statute of 1851." M In this country, also, statutes dispensing with the necessity of setting out a copy are to be found in a number of jurisdictions. The Massachusetts act' and the draft act likewise render this unnecessary." M Under such a provision, therefore, it would be in the discretion of the court, in the given case, as to whether the accused ought to be furnished with a copy of the instrument in a bill of particulars, but the inclusion of the copy in the indictment would under no circumstances be essential to the validity of the judgment.
It should be further provided that a statutory exception need not be negatived by the indictment. The distinction between exception and provisos so often depends upon mechanical considerations, that no prejudice will be worked to the defendant by relegating, in pleading, all exceptions to the present sfatus of provisos. Under the existing rule the validity of a conviction may turn upon a tenuous question of statutory construction in nowise affecting the merits of the case. 77 This change has been effected by the English rules 78 and the draft act.
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The Massachusetts act after recognizing what, in part, at least, is the rule obtaining in this State that there need be no negativing of "an excuse, exception or proviso which is not contained in the enacting clause * * * or which is' stated only by reference to other provisions of the statute, * * * unless it is necessary for a complete definition of the crime," distinctly provides that "if a statute which creates a crime permits an act which is therein described to be performed without criminality, under stated conditions, such conditions need not be negatived." 80 By the same token, it should not be incumbent upon the State to negative in the indictment an exception to the statute of limitations. Logically, initial proof that the prosecution is barred should be for the defense, as in common law causes, and the indictment ought to be sufficient if it shows a prima facie case apart from the question of time. There is really no good reason why a defendant who seeks to shield himself under this defense should not be required to plead the statute. The three procedures under discussion seem to preserve the practice in this regard as it stands with us, but the rule suggested has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States, 8 ' as well as by the courts of South Carolina, 82 Mississippi," 3 and Colorado. s4 In the Mississippi case passing on this question, it was said: "A statute of limitations is never part of an offense, but always a matter of defense, nor is any allusion to time contained in our statute relative to grand larceny. It will be time enough, therefore, for the district attorney to plead the exceptions to the statute when the statute itself has been pleaded by the accused. No sound rule of pleading can require him, in preferring the indictment, to anticipate the defense, and. negative it by setting forth the facts which render it unavail-
ing." 85
Another suggestion which commends itself is that concerning allegations in the alternative. Although the rule is that "where a statute forbids several things in the alternative, it is usually construed as creating but a single offense, and the indictment may charge the defendant with committing all the acts using the conjunction 'dnd,' where the statute uses the disjunctive 'or,' ",86 yet cases may arise where such construction cannot be put upon the statute., It should bq allowable, therefore, to charge the act or omission in the disjunctive. The same thing is true of the intent in cases where the act may have been done with one of several differ'ent intents. Allegations in the alternative are provided for by all three procedures under discussion. By the Massachusetts act "different means or intents," 88 and, by.the draft act, "different acts, means, intents or results," 89 may be alJeged in the alternative, while under the English rules, it is "acts, omissions, capacities or intentions or other matters stated in the alternative in the enactment" which may be thus charged. study may suggest, should 'be addressed the rules auxiliary to the purpose of preventing "reasonable notice" from being confounded with that "reasonable certainty of allegation" which confessedly implies the highest degree of certainty. Some of the changes recommended might be held not fully to consist with the constitutional requirement, but as to these, the burden can be cast upon the defendant, as in Massachusetts, to demand such further statement as the constitutional words may entitled him to. But in most cases the change can be made without trenching upon the constitutional provision in the original statement. In most cases, that is to say, with the change effected, the indictment will sufficiently state the "nature and cause of the accusation" without giving the defendant any absolute right to amplification or supplement. Though, in this State, we cannot pretend to be aught but laggards in the march of procedural reform some steps have been already taken in the direction indicated, some legislative precedent furnished for cutting down the common law doctrine of certainty in the indictment. For one thing, there is the statute with reference to arson, under which it is sufficient to charge the burning of a "building the property of another," ', without describing the building as would be required by the common law rule. In giving this construction to the statute, the Supreme Court recognized the principle which justified all such changes. The defendants said the court "were as well informed of the particular offense with which they were accused as if the indictment had described the building. If the indictment should be held insufficient, it would not be because, as a matter of fact, plaintiffs in error were not apprised of the particular offense with which they were charged. It would have to be because the indictment did not describe the building with the 'technical niceties' of the common law precedents. It would not be because plaintiffs in error were injured or suffered any prejudice because the building was not particularly described, but because the indictment did not meet the technical requirements of the common law rule, founded upon good reasons at the time of its adoption, but which reasons do not now exist in this State." 92 Then, again, there is the statute as to embezzlement which has made it sufficient in all such cases to allege generally in the indictment an embezzlement, fraudulent, conversion, or taking with intent of funds of a person, bank, incorporated company, or co-partnership to a certain value or amount, "without specifying any particulars of such embezzlement." '3 In the absence of this rule, said the Supreme Court, "it would be difficult to make the proof and the allegations of the indictment correspond." " And in a later case, the court, declining to hold erroneous the refusal of the lower court to grant a bill of particulars, speaks of the statutory indictment as "sufficiently specific to advise the plaintiff in error of the charges he was required to meet." ", Another statute of the sort is that relating to perjury and subornation of perjury, which, though preserving in a milder form than existed at common law the requirement before referred to that the court wherein the false oath was made shall be shown to have jurisdiction of the subject matter, does relieve the pleader entirely from other consequences of the common law rule, that is to say, from setting forth the proceedings at large, the commission and authority of the court and the form of the oath, with its mode of administration.
8
But the furthest step which has been taken in this direction'is the statute in relation to the "confidence game." The form of charge here given the stamp of approval is that the defendant "did on, etc., unlawfully and feloniously obtain (or attempt to obtain, as the case may be) from A. B. his money (or property) by means and by use of the confidence game." 17 The history of decision under this enactment may be found'in the case, already mentioned in another connection of People v. Brady." Hurd's Statutes, 1913, p. 820. 9 the offense in the general way before described, no variance between the allegations identifying the transaction contained in the indictment or bill of particulars whether amended or not, and the evidence shall be ground for acquittal, but the court is given full power at any time to amend so to conform the allegations to the evidence.
-2 As in the case of a defect in the indictment, if the defendant, in the opinion of the court has been "misled and prejudiced in his defense upon the merits" by such variance, the court is given power to postpone the trial." 2 3 So, too, no objection on the score of variance after verdict will be sustained unless prejudice in defending upon the merits and a failure of justice are affirmatively shown.' 24 These three procedures, then, furnish a sourcs from which we can draw in a recasting of the present rules relating to the indictment. As between the English act and the other two, the operative principle of the latter seems to commend itself for adoption. The general -charge, with its minimum requirements, supplemented by specification in the indictment itself or in a bill of particulars, is not only the more flexible procedure of the two, but is one which is admirably adapted to meet the demands of constitutional definition.
That we could constitutionally go as far as Massachusetts seems undeniable, for as has been seen, the provision in the Massachusetts Bill of Rights appears a more formidable obstacle than our own. If the plan adopted complies with the requirement that the defendant shall have the charge described to him "fully, plainly, substantially and formally," as has been repeatedly decided by the Supreme Judicial Court, 2 5 it should certainly not offend the requirement that he be informed of the "nature and cause of the accusation." And in circumscribing the boundaries of that description to which the defendant is entitled as a matter of constitutional right, the cases before Mentioned, and, particularly People -v. Brady, would seem to augur our ability to go considerably further than Massachusetts has ventured.
A statute, allowing amendments to the indictment would be a valuable adjunct. The constitutional question here involved, however, is ohe that demands an independent consideration. But, judging by the current of decision in other states, a statute could be validly passed providing, at least, for the cure by amendment of variance in matters of description not touching the essence of the charge either 12 2 Sec. 38. .23Sec. 38. Once we trenched on the domain of substance, however, the absence of prejudice to the defendant would probably not be regarded as a sufficient reason for supporting the statute.
1 -2 7 And while it is possible that a statute allowing amendment of the indictment to the extent contemplated in the draft act would be approved, it is quite clear that, without a constitutional amendment, we should be compelled to forego any such comprehensive provision as that of the new English act.
Improvement of criminal pleading thus finds its chief task in renovation of the rules relating to the accusation. But it ought not to stop there. If the requirement of reasonable notice should obtain in favor of the accused, it should also obtain, within limits, at least, in favor of the State. Under the' existing practice in Illinois, which permits any defense in bar to be shown under the plea of not guilty, there is no such thing as notice, reasonable or otherwise, of the defense which Th-e State is called upon to meet. To begin with, the common law rule requiring former conviction or acquittal to be the subject of a special plea, should be restored in principle. The defense of insanity at the time of the offense ought to be specially stated. This is already required in a number of jurisdictions. As appears from the statutory provisions collected in the report of Committee B of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology for 1911,28 New York, Alabama, Louisiana and Washington all demand that the State be given notice of an intended defense of insanity. Consistently with the recommendation that the State be exempted from negativing an exception to the statute of limitations, this defense should also be specially pleaded. Self defense should be similarly treated. And finally, the guilty defendant should be withdrawn from the shelter of that classic bulwark-the defense of alibi-by requiring that if an accused proposes to show that he was not present at the scene of the crime he must apprise the State to that effect. If the indictment does not state the time of the offense, this information can be obtained by applying for a bill of particulars. The suggestions as-to self defense and alibi come from the criminal procedure of Scotland, in which these defenses, as well as the defense of insanity at the time of the offense, or that the accused was asleep at the time of the offense, or that the crime was committed by another person named, must be specially notified to the prosecution.
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So far as the defenses of former jeopardy and statute of limitations are concerned, it would seem more in accord with sound principle to make these the subject of special pleas, as were former acquittal and conviction under the common law practice. Notice of the other defenses mentioned, viz.: Insanity, self-defense and alibi should more appropriately come by way of a written specification under the plea of not guilty, as is now the rule in New York with reference to insanity. But the allegations of every such plea or notice should be tested not by the common lawvrule of certainty applicable to pleas, but by the same criterion as that which should be applied to the accusation; that is to say, reasonable notice to the opposite party. The degree of explicitness entailed by the test will vary with the defense. In the case of former jeopardy an indication of the former proceedings upon which the defendant relies would in most instances suffice. A plea of the statute of limitations would sufficiently show the defense by a statement that more than the statutory period has elapsed sin~e the commission of the crime. Insanity and self-defense would require no more than a brief indication that these defenses were to be relied on. In the case of alibi, however, the usefulness of the notice would largely depend upon the defendant stating where he was at the time of the offense. While requiring this might at first sight make it appear that we were holding the defendant to a greater degree of specification than the State, there is here ample reason for insisting that he furnish the information in question, for the defendant, if any one, absolutely knows where he was and what he was doing when the crime was being committed. There is a wide difference between specification here and specification; for example, of the manner and means of a murder. In the Scottish practice notice of self-defense is accordingly in general terms, while the notice of alibi states particularly where and in whose company the accused was on the occasion of the offense.
30
Pleas and 'notices of this character should be amendable in ffirtherance of justice on substantially the same terms as the indictment or bill of particulars under the indictment ought to be, so that no fault in their structure shall serve to prejudice the defendant. If such an amendment made at the trial would prejudicially surprise the State, ' 29 Renton and Brown, Criminal Procedure according to the Law of Scotland, p. 73; Macdonald, Criminal Law of Scotland, 3 ed., p. 424. ' 30 Renton and Brown, op. cit., p. 319.
REPORM OF CRIMINAL PLEADING 361 trial would preserve the balance of fairness between the State and the accused. By the requirement of notice in such cases, and possibly in other instances, we place the State on an approximately equal basis with the theA a provision enabling the court, in that event, to postpone the defendant in respect to advance knowledge of their mutual contentions. Such a thing, to take the most obvious example as a manufactured alibi, will be difficult of accomplishment, for the State upon being notified can immediately take steps to inquire into the truth of the defendant's statement. And, with proper safeguards as to amendment, there is nothing in such a requirement that will lessen in any degree the protection which the law accords, and ought to accord, to an innocent defendant.
For the reform of criminal pleading, as a whole, the data which have thus been reviewed plainly mark the direction which our efforts should take. With their aid may be constructed a system which, retaining the solid virtues of the existing one, will strip it of all that constituted a reproach to our common sense. When we come into possession of such a system, reinforded, as it should be, by those modifications so urgently needed in other departments of our criminal procedure, we shall be able to say, as does a noted English barrister with reference to the new English act: "If hereafter a man who is proved by the evidence to be guilty is acquitted, the law will not be to blame, but the blame will rest with the judge or jury, or both. 
